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ABSTRACT: We develop a new paradigm to study social dilemmas, 
called exchange dilemmas. Exchange dilemmas arise from externalities of 
exchanges with third parties, and many real-life social dilemmas are more 
accurately modeled as exchange dilemmas rather than prisoner’s dilemmas. 
Building on focusing and framing research, we predict that defection is 
omnipresent in exchange dilemmas, which is corroborated in two very 
different experiments. Our results suggest that the fundamental problem 
of cooperation in many real-life social dilemmas may be more severe and 
harder to solve than suggested by traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma research, 
due to the presence of third parties. Directions for future research are 
suggested, focusing on relations with third parties.
KEYWORDS: cooperation, social dilemmas, social exchange, 
externalities, experiments, prisoner’s dilemma
Explaining cooperation in social dilemmas among unrelated individuals is a 
major problem in the behavioral sciences (Buchan et al. 2002; Dawes, 1980; Fehr 
et al. 2002, 2003; Kollock, 1998; Willer, 2009). The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
(PDG) is arguably the most frequently used theoretical paradigm for studying 
this problem (Axelrod, 1984; Kanazawa, 2007; Macy, 1991; Nowak et al. 1993, 
2005; Poundstone, 1992; Takahashi, 2000). Other well-known paradigms used 
for studying cooperation are the Ultimatum Game (e.g., Thaler 1988), the Trust 
Game (e.g., Snijders and Keren 2001), and the Public Good Game (e.g. Fehr and 
Gächter 2000, 2002). These models share with the PDG the important property 
that in finite interactions ‘free riding’ (i.e. not cooperating with one’s partner(s)) 
is an individual’s most rewarding strategy, irrespective of the behavior of others. 
Since reciprocal cooperation yields an outcome that is Pareto superior to the 
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outcome resulting from a total lack of cooperation, these paradigms are said to 
embody social dilemmas.  
In the present paper we employ a new paradigm to study social dilemmas. 
We examine social dilemmas arising from externalities of exchanges with third 
parties, and call them exchange dilemmas. We contend that many real-life social 
dilemmas can be modeled as exchange dilemmas, and we provide well-known 
examples of exchange dilemmas. We demonstrate in this paper that the exchange 
dilemma is a versatile and fruitful paradigm for studying social dilemmas and can 
enhance our understanding of real-life social dilemmas. We argue that defection 
rather than cooperation is omnipresent in exchange dilemmas, a prediction that 
is corroborated in two experiments.
Exchange dilemmas
An exchange is said to have externalities if it has direct consequences (either 
positive or negative) for the well-being of actors not themselves partners to the 
exchange. An instructive example of such exchanges with externalities is found 
in the context of collective decision making. Two political parties may agree to 
exchange their voting positions concerning two issues that have to be decided 
upon in Parliament (e.g., Dijkstra et al. 2008; Thomson et al., 2006; Udehn, 
1996). Since this “logrolling” changes the eventual outcome of the votes on both 
issues, the exchange directly affects the well-being of other political parties not 
involved in the agreement. 
Exchanges with externalities can give rise to social dilemmas (Dijkstra, 2009). 
The intuition is that if exchanges in a social system (such as a group or a social 
network) have large negative externalities for others, potential benefits from the 
exchange may be nullified by losses due to externalities. Those losses may even 
outweigh the benefits and make all actors worse off after all exchanges have 
been carried out, compared to a situation in which no exchanges had taken place. 
However, since for each actor every possible exchange in which he is a partner 
is individually profitable (while the negative externalities caused by it are borne 
by others), all actors have an incentive to complete as many social exchanges 
as they can. Thus, the actors are involved in a social dilemma: a situation in 
which individually rational behavior leads to collectively undesirable outcomes 
(Dawes, 1980). Van Assen et al. (2003) and Dijkstra et al. (2008) discuss this 
dilemma situation in the context of collective decision making. 
Characteristic of social dilemmas arising from exchanges with externalities, 
or exchange dilemmas, is that they arise from profitable exchange opportunities 
with third parties. A classic example is the in-shore fisheries in Bodrum and in 
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the Bay of Izmir, Turkey, discussed by Ostrom (1990). To prevent overfishing 
local fishers have to cooperate (i.e., restrict their catch) in a situation resembling 
a (N-person) PDG (Hardin, 1968). Fishermen catch their fish in order to exchange 
them with retailers and consumers, and these exchanges can thus be said to have 
negative externalities for other fishermen. The third parties in this particular 
exchange dilemma, the consumers and retailers of fish, have an impact on the 
degree of cooperation that the fishermen reach. Moreover, they have a stake in 
it as well, as cooperation between the fishermen means a shortage of fish at the 
market. Hence, when the fishermen cooperate, third parties can be expected 
to raise the prices they are willing to pay for fish, thereby trying to entice the 
fishermen to defect and catch more fish. In fact, Ostrom observes that fishing 
communities with easy market access (as is the case with the Bay of Izmir 
fishermen) are more exposed to such temptation by third parties than fishermen 
without (the Bodrum fishermen). Accordingly, the fishing communities with easy 
market access have a harder time sustaining cooperation.
Consider another well-known example of exchange dilemmas: cartels, such 
as OPEC. Cooperation between the oil-producing countries generally entails 
some kind of restriction on voluntary output. Successful cooperation results 
in the increased scarcity of oil and higher prices, which in turn leads to high 
profits for oil suppliers. Given that other countries also restrict their output 
(thus increasing the price of oil), each individual country is tempted to produce 
and sell more oil than agreed upon. The social dilemma in this case is clearly 
affected by the interactions between the oil-producing countries and the buyers 
of oil, who are the third parties. These interactions can be seen as exchanges 
with negative externalities for other OPEC countries. Third parties benefit from 
a low oil price and thus want suppliers to defect. Moreover, they are capable of 
affecting supplier profits through the prices they offer in their exchanges, thereby 
increasing the temptation to defect from the agreement for each OPEC country. 
Therefore, any sustainable cooperation between oil suppliers must be able to 
overcome the effects of the tempting behavior of third parties. 
We propose that real-life social dilemmas can be modeled as exchange 
dilemmas whenever they involve third parties, the social exchanges with whom 
create the dilemma via the externalities associated with them, and who have both 
the incentive and the opportunity to affect the payoffs of the actors in the dilemma.
The PDG and exchange dilemma as model of social dilemmas
One standard model of social dilemmas is the PDG. It is instructive to 
compare the PDG and exchange dilemma representations of social dilemmas 
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using the original anecdote by Albert W. Tucker. In Tucker’s anecdote, two 
men are charged with a joint violation of law and are held separately by the 
police. The police tell each of them that if one confesses while the other 
does not, the former will be set free and the latter will be severely punished. 
If both confess, both will receive moderate punishment. Finally, if neither 
confesses, the police have enough evidence to send them both to prison on a 
lesser charge, resulting in mild punishment. The dilemma consists of the fact 
that it is individually rational for both men to confess, since given the choice 
of the other prisoner an individual always reduces the severity of his own 
sentence by confessing. 
The resultant dilemma for the prisoners is typically represented as a 2×2 game 
between the prisoners, such as is illustrated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
B
Cooperate Defect
A
Cooperate 1,1 3,0
Defect 0,3 2,2
Note: Prisoners A and B can each choose to Cooperate (not confess) or to Defect (confess). Each 
cell gives the years in prison for A, and the years in prison for B (source: Poundstone, 1992: 118). 
In Table 1 both prisoners can either cooperate (not confess) or defect (confess), 
resulting in 2 years’ imprisonment for both if they both defect (confess to 
the police; lower right cell) and 1 year of imprisonment for both if they both 
cooperate (refuse to confess to the police; upper left cell). Unilateral defection 
results in 0 years of imprisonment for the confessor and 3 years for the prisoner 
who does not confess.  Defection (i.e., confession to the police) is the prisoner’s 
best choice since it reduces the sentence by one year, but if both defect both end 
up in prison for 2 years instead of 
Whereas the original anecdote is often transformed into the 2×2 PDG in Table 
1, the anecdote is naturally transformed into an exchange dilemma. Contrary 
to the case in Table 1, in the anecdote there is an active and interested third 
party: the police. The police structure the situation (e.g., putting the prisoners 
in separate cells), and offer the prisoners a bargain (in terms of prison years for 
cooperation and defection) with the goal of having the prisoners confess. And it 
is the interaction of the prisoners with the police that constitutes the cooperation 
problem for the prisoners. These interactions can be conceptualized as exchanges 
between the police and the prisoners, in which the former can offer fewer years in 
prison in return for a confession by the latter. Since such a confession entails the 
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conviction of the other prisoner, however, this is an exchange between prisoner 
and police (third party) with negative externalities. In these exchanges not only 
do the incentives for the prisoners matter, as the standard 2×2 PDG would 
suggest, but also the incentives for the police. No police officer will simply stop 
the interrogation when the prisoners refuse to confess: she will make alternative 
offers to them (by varying the length of the prison sentence), tempting them to 
confess. Note how this implies that the payoffs for the prisoners are variable 
rather than fixed.
Figure 1. The social dilemma and the PDG and exchange dilemma
The original social dilemma and both the PDG and exchange dilemma are 
schematically presented in Figure 1 along with some of their characteristics. The 
solid arrows signify that both the PDG and exchange dilemma are models of 
the social dilemma. In our experience, many researchers forget that the PDG 
is merely a model of social dilemmas, arguing that the exchange dilemma is 
derived from a PDG (cf. the dashed arrow in Figure 1). Typical comments we 
receive are “you should directly test the effects of including an interested third 
party in the PDG”, “how does converting the traditional binary (cooperate/
defect) PD paradigm into a continuous one affect the results?”, and “because 
of the third parties the situation is not seen as a PDG by the actors”.  We stress, 
however, that the only right of existence of the PDG is that it is a model of the 
social dilemma. The exchange dilemma is another, and as Figure 1 shows, a 
different model of the social dilemma. Both models have their merits, and should 
be evaluated in comparison with the social dilemmas they model.
Real life 
social dilemmas
PDG
•  No third parties
•  Fixed payoffs
•  Simultaneous decisions
Exchange dilemma
•  Third parties who have incentives 
to affect payoffs and behavior of 
the actors in the dilemma
•  Variable payoffs
•  Sequential decisions
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Overview
We first explain how exchange dilemmas can be modeled. Then we derive 
predictions concerning actor behavior and cooperation in exchange dilemmas. 
Our main prediction is that defection in the exchange dilemma is omnipresent, 
because actors in the dilemma are primarily focused on creating profitable 
exchanges with third parties rather than on the negative externalities resulting in 
the dilemma. Our prediction is verified in two experimental studies, Study 1 and 
Study 2. The two major differences between the studies are how they were run 
(face-to-face, paper-and-pencil in Study 1 versus web-based with participants 
in separate cubicles in Study 2) and the interaction structure (one third party in 
Study 1 versus two third parties in Study 2). Finding similar results from both 
studies would increase our confidence in the effectiveness of our experimental 
manipulation (i.e., including social exchange relations with third parties). In 
addition, similar results from both studies would also enhance our confidence 
in the working of the theoretical mechanisms in real-life exchange dilemmas, 
and enhance the external validity of our conclusions. The results of both studies 
corroborate the main prediction that defection is omnipresent in real-life social 
dilemmas represented as exchange dilemmas. The implications of our findings 
are discussed in the final section. 
MODELING EXCHANGE DILEMMAS
Following a long tradition of experimental research in social exchange in 
sociology and social-psychology (e.g., Cook et al., 1983; Molm, 1997; Willer, 
1999), we model exchange relations using mutually profitable bilateral exchanges 
of resources. In explaining how introducing externalities in a social exchange 
can induce a social dilemma situation, we describe the exchange dilemma used 
in Study 1. 
In Study 1 both actors A and C have the opportunity to change with B; a 
situation represented by the so-called 3-Line exchange network of Figure 2a, 
in which the lines represent the possibilities (but not obligations) for exchange 
between connected actors. Actor B can change with either A or C, or both. The 
actors are endowed with different amounts of different resources. This is depicted 
in the third row of Table 2. There it is shown that A and B have 60 and 10 units 
of resource X, respectively, whereas B and C have 30 and 60 units of resource Y, 
respectively. Actors’ payoffs for a unit of X and Y are presented in the fourth row 
of Table 2. A, B, and C obtain 1, 3, 5 money units, respectively, for 1 unit of X, 
whereas all actors obtain 1 money unit for 1 unit of Y.  Thus, A and B can make 
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a mutually profitable exchange by trading B’s 30 units of resource Y for 10 to 30 
units of A‘s resource X. Similarly, B and C can complete a mutually profitably 
exchange by trading B’s 10 units of resource X for 30 to 50 units C’s resource Y.
Figure 2a. The 3-Line network of Study 1
Figure 2b. The box network of Study 2
Table 2.  Endowments and payoffs of participants in Experiment 1 and Exper-
iment 2
Participants  A B C D
Resources  X Y X Y X Y X Y
Study 1 Endowments 60 0 10 30 0 60Payoffs 1 1 3 1 5 1
Study 2 Endowments 1 0 0 48 1 0 0 48Payoffs 24 1 48 1 24 1 48 1
The exchange dilemma is created by introducing negative externalities of 
exchanges between A and C. By design of Study 1, whenever actor A transfers 1 
unit of X to B, actor C loses 5 points (C’s payoff for one unit of X). Conversely, 
whenever actor C transfers 1 unit of Y to B, actor A loses 1 point (A’s payoff for 
one unit of Y). Thus, it is as if the A and C actors are drawing the resources they 
use in exchanges with B from a common pool, like the fishermen investigated 
by Ostrom (1990). The resources they receive from B, however, are private, 
for instance representing the money obtained by a fisherman (A or C) from 
consumers (B). Similarly, the exchange dilemma in Study 1 can be seen as an 
A B C
A
D
B
C
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example of a collective decision situation where (i) A and C disagree about two 
issues X and Y, (ii) B moves his position on X to A and on Y to C, resulting in a 
loss for C and A, respectively, (iii) there exists a loss that is not compensated by 
the private gain they obtain from their exchange with B.
The negative externalities imply the payoffs for A and C as shown in Table 3, 
as a function of x and y transferred by A and C, respectively. If A transfers x to 
B in exchange for B’s 30 units of Y, A obtains 30 – x, whereas C loses 5x (lower 
left cell). If C transfers y to B in exchange for B’s 50 units of Y, C obtains 50 – y, 
whereas A loses y (upper right cell). The payoffs resulting when both exchanges 
are completed are obtained by adding the payoffs of the two separate exchanges 
(lower right cell). 
The exchange dilemma in Table 3 corresponds to a social dilemma caused by 
the exchange opportunities with third party B: 
 (i)  completing an exchange always increases an actor’s payoffs, since exchange 
is mutually profitable (i.e., for both the actor and the third party), and 
(ii)  A’s loss, created by an exchange of C with B, cannot be compensated by A 
exchanging with B, and similarly, for C. 
Table 3. The Exchange Dilemma induced by Condition 2 of Study 1
C
Not Exchange Exchange
A
Not Exchange 0, 0 –y, 50–y 
Exchange 30–x, –5x 30–x–y, 50–5x–y  
Note: x and y are the number of units of X and Y transferred to B, respectively; 
10 ≤ x ≤ 30, and 30 ≤ y ≤ 50, for mutually profitable exchanges.
Consequently, the order of payoffs in the four cells corresponds to that of a 
social dilemma, with defection (exchanging with B) being the best alternative 
for both A and C, and mutual cooperation (both not exchanging) yielding better 
payoffs to both A and C than when both defect. Moreover, contrary to the 
traditional 2×2 PDG of Table 1, the social exchange relationships with the third 
party are explicitly modeled (see again Figure 1): a third party (B) is present, the 
interactions with whom constitute the choices (exchange or not) for the actors in 
the dilemma (A and C), and who (B) has the incentives and the possibilities to 
influence the payoffs of the actors A and C by offering more or less profitable 
exchanges to them. 
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THEORY AND MAIN HYPOTHESIS
Experimental studies using the PDG conclude that cooperation in social 
dilemmas is quite common. Sally (1995) found an average cooperation rate of 
almost 50%, reviewing 130 treatments with different experimental conditions. 
Factors affecting cooperation include the possibility of pre-play communication 
(increasing cooperation by about 40%), the size of the ‘temptation payoff’ (i.e., 
the payoff earned by a unilateral defector; the smaller the size, the greater the 
cooperation rate), repeated play (the cooperation rate decreases as more and more 
rounds are played), and whether or not payoffs are monetary (monetary payoffs 
elicit on average about 20-25% more cooperation than non-monetary ones). 
Notwithstanding the sizable cooperation rate found in PDG research, our main 
prediction is that there will hardly be any cooperation in exchange dilemmas. Two 
reasons underlie this expectation. First, framing and focusing render cooperation 
between the actors in an exchange dilemma unlikely. Evidence about framing 
(Kahneman et al. 1979, 1981; Levin et al. 1998) and focusing (Legrenzi et al. 
1993) shows that differences in the way choices are represented to and conceived 
by individuals have large effects on these choices. 
From the perspective of exchange dilemmas, a particularly useful distinction 
is the one between ‘valence framing’ and ‘label framing’ (e.g., Dufwenberg et al. 
2011). Valence framing concerns the fact that different presentations can put the 
same information in either a ‘positive’ or a ‘negative’ light. In valence framing, 
the participant’s reference point is shifted, for example by presenting the same 
information alternatively as a gain or as a loss. Label framing concerns ‘mere 
wording’, leaving the participant’s reference point unchanged. For instance, 
Liberman et al. (2004) show how the name attached to a PDG (either ‘Community 
Game’ or ‘Wall Street Game’) can strongly affect participants’ choices. 
According to cognitive psychological theory, individuals construct a mental 
model of the social dilemma at hand, containing salient aspects of the situation, 
but not necessarily all relevant information from an incentive point of view 
(Johnson-Laird 1983). Focusing implies that different presentations of the same 
information lead to different mental models, which in turn determine how the 
social dilemma is framed by the individual: which norms of appropriate behavior 
are invoked (if any), which consequences are perceived of as costs, and which as 
gains, etc.? Different frames may then lead to different decisions and behavior. 
Applied to the exchange dilemma this reasoning implies that each actor 
(‘prisoner’) is focused on making a potentially profitable deal with the third 
party (‘police’), rather than on the possibility of cooperation with the other actor 
(‘prisoner’). Thus, the existence and the characteristics of the exchange relation 
are the most salient informational elements, and are prominent in the mental 
64
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2016)
JACOB DIJKSTRA – MARCEL A.L.M. VAN ASSEN
model. This focusing effect is enhanced by the fact that the third party (‘police’) 
is active vis-à-vis the actor (‘prisoner’), whereas the other actor is not. From a 
framing point of view, the relationship with the third party has two important 
properties that are closely related but analytically distinct. First of all, there is 
the exchange label attached to the relationship. This label likely invokes norms 
of competitiveness and individual gain, much like the name ‘Wall Street Game’ 
does in the PDG. In addition, since exchanges with the third party are mutually 
beneficial, valence framing implies that an actor perceives that striking a deal 
with the third party is equivalent to cooperation with the third party, rather than 
as defection against the other actor. Therefore, we expect actors are more likely 
to defect in the exchange dilemma than in the traditional 2-person 2×2 PDG of 
Table 1. 
The second reason for expecting no cooperation in the exchange dilemma is that 
the third party will try to tempt each actor into defecting by making him better 
offers if necessary. Sally (1995: 75) in his review found that the opportunity to 
double one’s reward by unilateral defection decreased the likelihood of cooperation 
by 11%-16%. Moreover, since the offers of the third party generally differ on a 
continuous scale, the actors’ payoffs in the exchange dilemma are variable and 
continuous rather than fixed, as in the PDG of Table 1. This continuity of payoffs 
makes it easier for the third party to adapt the temptations for the actors in the 
exchange dilemma, without making large concessions and thereby incurring large 
costs. In addition to the main prediction of hardly any cooperation in the exchange 
dilemma, we therefore hypothesize that the third party elicits defection in the 
exchange dilemma by increasing the temptation payoff for the actors. 
STUDY 1
The aim of Study 1 was to examine to what extent cooperation occurs between 
the two ‘prisoners’ A and C in the exchange dilemma of Table 3. The cooperation 
rate; i.e., the extent to which A and C do not exchange with B, is compared 
to the extent to which A and C fail to exchange in an exchange situation with 
two independent bilateral exchange opportunities, without externalities between 
A and C. In their study on bilateral exchange Dijkstra and Van Assen (2008: 
28) found average rates of failure to exchange of .08 to .18 in similar exchange 
situations without externalities. 
Study 1 contained 2 conditions: the “Dilemma” condition representing the 
exchange dilemma of Table 3, and the ”Exchange” condition with the same 
exchange opportunities but without externalities. In both conditions, actors were 
endowed with resources and payoffs according to the third and fourth rows of 
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Table 2. In the Exchange condition, all the costs and benefits of exchange were 
private to all participants. In the Dilemma condition negative externalities 
of exchange exist between the A and the C participants, as described earlier 
(Table 3). To allow estimation of the effect of negative externalities per se, B 
was not informed of the negative externalities of the exchanges for A and C. 
As explained above, focusing implies that A and C in the exchange dilemma 
are focused on the beneficial interaction with B, and not on the negative 
externalities of this interaction for each other. Framing subsequently implies 
that the exchange with B is conceived by A and C as mutually profitable 
cooperation with B, instead of defection against the other actor. 
If defection (i.e., exchanging with B) in the exchange dilemma is the norm and 
the prisoners’ behavior in the Dilemma condition is not affected by the negative 
externalities (because of framing and focusing), we can expect a cooperation rate 
in the Dilemma condition similar to the rate of not exchanging in the Exchange 
condition, without externalities.  Alternatively, if A and C in the exchange 
dilemma do take the negative externalities of their exchanges into account, then 
the proportion of not exchanging will be higher in the Dilemma than in the 
Exchange condition. 
Because of the negative externalities of exchange in the Dilemma condition 
actors A and C may initially be reluctant to exchange with B. However, B can 
tempt A and C to exchange by making them better offers. Such tempting behavior 
of B is unnecessary in the Exchange condition. We test whether B tempts A and C 
by verifying whether A and C transfer fewer units of X and Y, respectively, in the 
Dilemma than in the Exchange condition.
Method
Twenty-four participants were recruited through e-mails sent to students of a 
Dutch university. Participants earned an average of 15 euros, and an experimental 
session lasted for approximately 30 minutes. 
Participants were randomly assigned to roles (A, B, or C) they occupied 
during the entire experiment. A and C were seated opposite to B, with a divider 
preventing A and C from seeing each other. Study 1 had a within-subjects design, 
with four groups starting in the Exchange condition and the other four groups 
starting in the Dilemma condition. After the instructions, one practice round 
(without externalities) was played, after which participants played six rounds of 
each condition. A round ended either when no more exchanges could be made, or 
when 200 seconds had elapsed. After each round resources were replenished and 
the game started afresh. After each round subjects were told how much they had 
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earned that round. The value of participants’ initial endowments was subtracted 
from their points, so that they only earned points for exchanging. 
Study 1 was a face-to-face, pencil-and-paper experiment, in which participants 
made offers to each other through specially prepared forms. Participants used 
these forms to write the number of units of resource they demanded from their 
potential exchange partner such that all were informed of the ongoing negotiations 
between any pair of participants. Communication was only possible through offer 
forms; no speaking or gesticulation was allowed. Participants were provided with 
verbal instructions by the experiment leader explaining how offers could be made 
and accepted. Participants knew the number of rounds to be played, and the value 
of one resource unit for all participants in terms of points. They knew only the 
monetary value of a point for themselves but not for others. 
Results
In the Exchange condition, the proportions of no exchange completed in six 
rounds across the eight groups were .083 (SD = .126) and .125 (SD = .148) for A 
and B, and B and C, respectively. The cooperation rates (i.e., no exchange rates) in 
the Dilemma condition were .188 (SD = .188) and .229 (SD = .198), respectively. 
Neither of the cooperation rates in the Dilemma condition was significantly 
larger than the corresponding no exchange rate in the Exchange condition (for 
A and B, t(7) = 1.30, one-tailed p = .117; for B and C, t(7) = 1.19, one-tailed p = 
.136). To obtain a more powerful test we combined the two exchanges by running 
a multilevel regression analysis on the proportions (Snijders et al. 1999). This 
test combining both exchanges also did not reveal a larger rate of exchange in 
the Dilemma (.208 [SD = .188]) than in the Exchange condition 1 (.104 [SD = 
.134]) (t(16) = 1.45, one-tailed p = .08). Hence we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that the cooperation rate (proportion of no exchange) is equal in the Dilemma 
and Exchange conditions. Cohen’s d was .64, representing a medium effect size. 
The observed difference in exchange proportions between the two conditions 
was mainly produced by one out of eight groups of participants in which A and C 
mutually cooperated, i.e., did not exchange with B, in the last three rounds of the 
Dilemma condition. Averaged across the remaining seven groups of participants 
in the Dilemma condition mutual cooperation occurred only in 4% of the trials, 
and average proportions of cooperation were .143 and .167 for A and B, and B 
and C, respectively. 
An analysis of the average number of units of X and Y that A and C transferred 
to B, respectively, suggests that B did not need to convince A and C to exchange 
by making them better offers in the Dilemma condition. Average numbers of 
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units transferred by A and C respectively, were 14.5 and 34.0 in the Exchange 
condition, and 13.6 and 34.3 in the Dilemma condition (one-tailed Wilcoxon 
signed rank test; p = .32 and p = .64, respectively). 
Discussion Study 1
The rate of cooperation in the Dilemma condition (.208) was close to the 
proportion of no exchange in the Exchange condition (.104). Moreover, this rate 
of cooperation is also considerably lower than the average cooperation rate found 
by Sally (1995) in his review (.47), and cooperation in the public goods game 
(about half of one’s endowment; Camerer, 2003) and trust game (also about 
half one’s endowment; Johnson and Mislin, 2011). Our current results therefore 
suggest that defection is the predominant action in the exchange dilemma; when 
a third party is present (the ‘police officer’) who can affect the prisoners’ payoffs, 
the prisoners readily confess. Moreover, the mere presence of the third party 
sufficed to produce this effect; B did not have to make better offers to A and 
C in order to tempt them into a confession. Thus, the focusing of A and C on 
their profitable exchange opportunities with B and the framing of the situation in 
terms of a profitable exchange were sufficient to make A and C defect. 
STUDY 2
The aim of Study 2 was to examine cooperation in the exchange dilemma as 
in Study 1, but with a different experimental setting that was web-based and in 
which two third parties were present. The cooperation rate of Study 2 is again 
compared to the lower benchmark observed in the Exchange condition of Study 
1, i.e., .104. 
The last two rows of Table 2 present the resources and payoffs the participants 
(A, B, C, and D) were endowed with in the exchange dilemma of Study 2. 
These resources and payoffs imply that profitable exchanges are possible 
between the connected pairs in the box network of Figure 2b. We constrained 
participants to a maximum of one exchange per experimental round. Just like 
in the Dilemma condition of Study 1, negative externalities of exchange exist 
between the A and the C participants: whenever A (C) exchanges with either 
B or D, C (A) loses 24 points. These exchange opportunities and externalities 
together determine the payoff matrix of Table 4 for A and C. The payoff matrix 
of Table 4 represents an exchange dilemma for A and C, in which there are now 
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two third parties (B and D).2 Thus, this situation resembles one in which two 
fishermen (A and C) fishing from common waters have exchange relations with 
two potential buyers (B and D). Alternatively, A and C could be two country-
members of the OPEC, whose exchanges in excess of the agreed quota spoil the 
market and harm other OPEC members.
Table 4. The Exchange Dilemma induced by Study 2
C
Not Exchange Exchange
A
Not Exchange 0, 0 – 24, yC – 24  
Exchange yA – 24, – 24 yA – 48, yC – 48
Note: yA and yC denote the number of units of Y received by A and C respectively; 
24 ≤ yA, yC ≤ 48, for mutually profitable exchanges.
Focusing and framing in this exchange dilemma again suggest that the 
cooperation rate in Study 2 will equal the proportion of no exchange in an 
exchange situation without externalities (Exchange condition of Study 1). Again, 
because of the negative externalities in the exchange dilemma actors A and C 
may initially be reluctant to exchange with B and D. However, B and D can 
tempt them to exchange by letting them have more than half of the surplus 
of the exchange. The surplus of exchange in each relation (i.e., total payoffs 
without externalities) in Study 2 equals 24. To test whether B and D tempt A 
and C we verify whether A and C obtain on average more than 12 (disregarding 
externalities) from the exchanges they carry out.
Method
Sixteen participants were recruited from a participant pool at a large state 
university in the USA. Participants earned an average of 10 dollars. An 
experimental session lasted for approximately 30 minutes. Participants made 
offers through computer terminals, using the ExNet 3.0 software (Girard 
2003).
2  In fact, Table 4 is not a dilemma situation if either A or C obtains all (48) units of Y. This is very 
unlikely, since it implies that B or D do not gain in their exchange with A or C. Indeed, it never 
occurred that A or C obtained all units of Y in Study 2.
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Participants were randomly assigned to player roles (A, B, C, and D) they 
occupied during the entire experiment. Upon arrival they were guided to isolated 
experimentation booths, in which they could neither hear nor see any other 
participant. They then received written instructions that they kept during the 
entire experiment. After they finished reading the instructions three practice 
rounds were played, in which they played the exchange game without negative 
externalities between A and C. After the practice rounds it was explained to A 
and C how their payoffs depended on externalities and participants played ten 
rounds of the exchange dilemma. A round ended either when no more exchanges 
could be made, or when 180 seconds had elapsed. After each round resources 
were replenished and the game started afresh.
After each round participants were informed of their earnings in that round, 
but not of the earnings of other participants. The participants knew the number 
of rounds to be played, and the value of one resource unit for all participants 
in terms of points, but not the monetary value of a point for other participants. 
Similar to Study 1, B and D were unaware of the negative externalities between 
participants A and C. All participants were informed of the ongoing negotiations 
between any pair of participants in their group via their computer screens. 
Results
The average proportion of exchanges completed in ten rounds in Study 2 was 
.875 for C and .9 for A. The combined cooperation rate (.112 [SD = .173]) was 
not significantly larger than the benchmark of .104 (t-test for two independent 
samples, t(23) = .10, one-tailed p = ,46)3,  with a very small effect size (Cohen’s 
d = .05). Thus, we found no evidence for cooperation at all in the exchange 
dilemma of Study 2.
The average payoffs of A and C were not significantly larger than 12, suggesting 
that B and D did not need to tempt A and C into exchange. The estimated average 
payoffs of A and C as obtained with multilevel analysis were in fact smaller than 
12 (for C 10.97, t(36) = –1.69, one-tailed p = .954; for A 10.94, t(36) = -1.95, one-
tailed p = .974). 
Analysis at the level of the four groups reveals the cooperation rates .3, .1, 
.05, and 0. No evidence for mutual cooperation was found in the latter three 
3  The denominator of the t-value equals 00374.002577. + , the first and second number representing the 
standard error of the proportion of Condition 1 in Experiment 1 obtained by multilevel analysis and 
the standard error of the combined proportion in Experiment 2, respectively. The proportions have 
16 and 8 degrees of freedom.
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groups. In the first group mutual cooperation (i.e., both A and C not exchanging 
in the same round) occurred only once (1%). The proportion of cooperation in 
the first group was .3 mainly because C exchanged in only half of the rounds. 
C in the first group was greedy; on average he wanted to obtain almost 90% of 
the profits of exchanging, a demand typically rejected by a B or D participant. 
His greediness, however, can also be interpreted as an attempt to instigate 
cooperation with A. Indeed, both A and C in the first group initially demanded 
very favorable exchange rates (24, which is the maximum profit) for themselves 
in rounds 8 to 10. This led to successful mutual cooperation in round 8, but after 
C was successfully tempted to exchange with a profit of 18 in rounds 9 and 10, 
A only obtained 16 and 8 in rounds 9 and 10, respectively. Some evidence for 
attempts at cooperation was found in later rounds of group 1.
Discussion Study 2
The cooperation rate in Study 2 was similar to the rate of no exchange in the 
Exchange condition of Study 1. Furthermore, the realized payoffs of A and C 
participants suggest they did not need to be tempted to exchange. Hence, similar 
to Study 1, the results suggest that defection is the default action in an exchange 
dilemma. 
Although the overall results of Study 2 suggest no cooperation at all in the 
exchange dilemma, closer inspection of the results in one of the groups hints 
at attempts to cooperate. Both A and C initially made very high demands to 
B and D in later rounds in that group. Making such high demands renders 
successful exchange unlikely. In addition, the high demands provide some sort 
of reassurance for the participant making them. If accepted, they yield a high 
payoff, such that the negative consequences of the exchange of the other actor 
in the exchange dilemma are somewhat compensated. Nevertheless, except for 
one round, C and A could not resist the temptation to exchange, and the one who 
was exchanging second received the lowest payoff. The observation that the first 
exchange was more profitable than the second could have triggered A and C to 
try and be the first to exchange. In the end, even in the group in which attempts 
at cooperation were observed, the cooperation rate of .3 was low.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Many real-life social dilemmas involve a third party (i.e., a police officer in 
the language of the PDG) who is capable of changing the payoffs of the actors 
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in the dilemma (the ‘prisoners’) and is motivated to do so in order to tempt the 
actors into defection. We argued in this paper that these social dilemmas can be 
fruitfully modeled as exchange dilemmas. Moreover, based on a focusing and 
framing argument we predicted hardly any cooperation in the exchange dilemma.
We tested our hypotheses in two experimental studies where one (Study 1) or 
two (Study 2) third parties could negotiate over mutually profitable exchanges 
with two actors in a social dilemma. For these actors, exchanging with a 
third party implied defection towards the other actor. Hardly any cooperation 
was observed in the exchange dilemmas of both our studies; the cooperation 
rates of .208 (Study 1) and .112 (Study 2) were much closer to the proportions 
of no exchange when no externalities were present (.104) than to the average 
cooperation rate in PDGs found by Sally (1995) (.47). 
In addition to our focusing and framing argument we also argued that in an 
exchange dilemma a third party can surmount any initial reluctance of actors 
in the dilemma to exchange by making them better offers. We did not observe 
this effect, however, and conclude that the focusing of the actors on their 
exchange opportunity with the third party and the framing of these relationships 
as profitable exchanges sufficed to produce very high rates of defection. There 
apparently was no need for third parties to tempt the actors in the social dilemma 
to exchange
We note that in our studies third parties were unaware of the exchange 
dilemma between the actors. The implication is that the ‘police’ (B and D) did 
not know that the ‘prisoners’ (A and C) might be reluctant, and why. Like in 
Tucker’s anecdote, a real police officer would of course know about the dilemma 
between the prisoners and would therefore more readily contemplate a strategy of 
temptation by changing the payoffs. Since we wanted to study the effects of the 
externalities-induced exchange dilemma only, and not the effects of changes in 
information for third parties (especially when comparing exchange rates to those 
of the Exchange condition 1 in Study 1), we chose to keep third parties ignorant 
of the exchange dilemma. Our results show that temptation by the police was not 
necessary. Revealing the negative externalities of exchange to the third parties may 
have resulted in more temptation and hence higher payoffs for the actors in their 
exchanges with the third party, and even less cooperation than currently found in 
both studies.
A difference between the PDG and exchange dilemmas studied here is that play 
in the PDG is simultaneous, whereas it was sequential in the exchange dilemma. 
Our design shares features with the Alternating Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
(APDG) (Frean, 1994; Sally, 1995), since participants observed each other’s 
moves. The expectation is that sequential play renders cooperation more likely 
(Hayashi et al. 1999; Kiyonari et al. 2000). The intuition is that C will defect after 
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observing a defection of A in the APDG, resulting in a game where the T payoff 
is unattainable for A, thereby making defection less and cooperation more likely 
in the APDG. The fact that we nonetheless found hardly any cooperation in the 
exchange dilemma emphasizes the robustness of our findings.
Studies 1 and 2 were different in a number of important aspects. Study 1 was 
a face-to-face paper-and-pencil study, whereas Study 2 was computer-mediated 
with participants unable to communicate but through sending and receiving 
offers via their computer terminals. In Study 1 six rounds of exchange were 
played with only one third party, while in Study 2 ten rounds were played with 
two third parties. Finally, in Study 1 the actors in the dilemma (i.e., the A and C 
subjects) were unequal with respect to their endowments and payoffs, whereas in 
Study 2 the actors were identical in these respects. Despite all these differences, 
results of the exchange dilemmas in both studies were strikingly similar: hardly 
any cooperation and no need for temptation by third parties. This makes the 
evidence that the high rates of defection in the exchange dilemma were indeed 
caused by the addition of the social exchange relations with the third parties more 
persuasive. Moreover, it also fortifies our argument that in still other contexts, 
such as in the real-life exchange dilemmas described in the introduction, the 
mechanism will operate similarly.
Our results suggest that the fundamental problem of cooperation in many real-
life social dilemmas may be more severe and harder to solve than suggested by 
traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma research due to the presence of third parties. That 
is, cooperation will be harder to attain and maintain in the presence of an active 
third party interested in defection, than without such a party. In such cases, an 
understanding of the relationship between the agents in the dilemma with the 
third party must be an integral part of the explanation of observed instances of 
cooperation and defection. 
Important elements of the relationships between the agents and the third 
party include the possibilities of reputation formation (e.g., Raub et al. 1990) 
and punishment (e.g., Fehr et al. 2002) among the prisoners. Both these factors 
are known to have a positive effect on cooperation in traditional PDGs (Rand et 
al. 2013). It is an open question to what extent the positive effects of reputation 
formation and punishment can override the temptation of the actors in the 
dilemma to exchange with the third party, thereby increasing the cooperation in 
exchange dilemmas.
The crucial element is obviously the third party. We suspect that many features 
of the relation with the third party have a strong effect on cooperation in the 
exchange dilemma. First, the presence of multiple third parties competing for 
exchange with the actors in the dilemma will increase the temptation to exchange 
for these actors, further decreasing cooperation. This effect is aggravated by 
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the fact that the negative externalities of the exchange become smaller when 
temptation increases. Another factor is the access of the third parties to the 
actors. We expect that if the third parties can directly negotiate with the actors 
in the dilemma, then cooperation will be more difficult. Examining the role of 
the third party and its relation with the actors in an exchange dilemma hence 
provides interesting and important avenues for future research.
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